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Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game
theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use
their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always act
as if others apply the principle of dominance). However, existing experimental evidence
questions the empirical accuracy of dominance solvability. In this study, we study the
relationships between the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive skills,
cognitive reflection, and fluid intelligence. We provide evidence that the behaviors in
accordance with dominance and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by
one’s fluid intelligence rather than cognitive reflection. Individual cognitive skills, however,
only explain a small fraction of the observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy
of theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not only depends on
individual cognitive characteristics, but also, perhaps more importantly, on the decision
making environment itself.
Keywords: dominance solvability, cognitive skills, CRT, Raven’s test, experiment
JEL classification: C72, D83
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a game in which every decision maker is faced with a finite set of choices such that one
specific choice always brings him higher monetary payoff than other choices, irrespective of the
choices made by other players. In this situation, the individual choice boils down to going for either
a higher or a lower monetary payoff. The straightforward response of a decision maker who cares
about his monetary payoff is to disregard dominated actions—i.e., actions that may only deteriorate
payoff relative to other actions. This dominance principle is the most basic solution concept of
game theory (Camerer, 2003). It becomes very powerful when embedded in a strategic reasoning
as a stepwise process. In each step, the dominance principle implies that dominated strategies
should be eliminated from an agent’s strategy space. In an important class of games—known as
dominance-solvable games—this iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique
solution.
Strikingly, the data collected from numerous experiments on dominance-solvable games raise
important questions about the empirical accuracy of predictions derived from this principle.
Subjects tend to display less strategic sophistication than is needed to justify many applications
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of iterated dominance (and related refinements) to model human
decisionmaking in strategic environments (Crawford, 2004). The
beauty contest game is one of the textbook examples of this
issue1. A given set of players is asked to choose a number in
the range [0, 100]. To win the game, a player should choose a
number that is the closest to p = 2/3 of the average of all chosen
numbers. Any number above 2/3 × 100 ≈ 66.7 violates first-
order dominance, because the average has to be lower than 100.
Knowing this, players should all choose numbers no greater than
66.7, meaning that their average may not exceed 2/3 × 66.7 ≈
44.5. This reasoning lowers the target as the number of iterations
increases, eventually leading to the unique Nash equilibrium in
which all players choose 0. In many experimental studies of this
game, the numbers chosen by players are used as a proxy of the
depth of iterated reasoning.2 A well replicated stylized fact is to
observe 1/3 of subjects choosing a number higher than 67, and at
least 1/3—a number between 44 and 67.
This paper focuses on one of the earliest and simplest example
of such an empirical inaccuracy of dominance solvability,
adapted from a 2× 2 game discussed in Rosenthal (1981) and first
brought to the laboratory by Beard and Beil (1994)3. The normal-
form representation of this game is given in Table 1. With L <
S < H, m < h, and s < h, the game is one-step dominance
solvable: the elimination of player B’s weakly dominated strategy
l immediately leads to the Pareto-Nash equilibrium (R, r)4.
In line with observed behavior in other dominance solvable
games, numerous studies (summarized in Table 2) find frequent
failures to achieve the Pareto-Nash equilibrium. In spite of
variations in the design (described in the table), deviations from
the standard theoretical predictions are systematic and sizable.
First, dominance is frequently violated by player Bs. Depending
on the exact experimental setup, up to 27% column players
choose a strictly dominated action. Second, player As violate
TABLE 1 | Generic form of the normal representation of Rosenthal (1981)
dominance solvable game.
Player B
l r
Player A L (S; s) (S; s)
R (L; m) (H; h)
1This class of games has been first introduced by Moulin (1986) as the p−beauty
contest games, where p (often equal 2/3) stands for the target fraction of all
numbers’ average.
2See Nagel (1995) and Ho et al. (1998) for early evidence from the laboratory,
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) for a laboratory experiment supporting a
behavioral model of bounded rationality, and Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) for
related evidence from the field.
3Both Camerer (2003) and Crawford (2004) consider this game as a basic
example of a dominance-solvable game, and a glaring case of a mismatch between
theoretical predictions and actual behavior.
4If the game is played sequentially (so that player A moves first), the same solution
can be obtained through backward induction. Note that if s > h, the solution
does not change (since l remains player B’s weakly dominated strategy), but the
outcomes are no longer Pareto-rankable. Beard and Beil (1994), Schotter et al.
(1994), and Goeree and Holt (2001) find that this environment also generates
important violations of standard theoretical predictions.
iterated dominance, even in those cases in which player Bs
commonly obey dominance. As an example, while only 6%
of player Bs violate dominance in Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn
(2014)-ET2 and BT2, 26% of row players still contradict the
predictions of dominance solvability by choosing L (and this
figure may even attain 86% in other instances, see Beard, Beil –
Tr. 5 in Table 2). As shown in the three middle columns of the
table, both the absolute and the relative size of the stakes vary a
great deal from one study to the other. Several lessons emerge
from this accumulated evidence. First, both players react to their
own monetary incentives. Second, in some cases player As also
adjust their behavior to player Bs’ incentives. Finally, as shown by
Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014), players’ inefficient behavior
does not fade away with repetition and cannot be explained by
inequality aversion (as framed by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
The aim of the present paper is to explore whether this
empirical puzzle is related to players’ cognitive skills. In this
sense, our investigation belongs to a recent and growing body
of experimental studies in both psychology and economics
which investigate the relationship between strategic behavior
and cognitive skills5. The main conclusion that can be drawn
from these studies is that high cognitive skills predict strategic
sophistication and efficient decision making. First, people with
high cognitive skills make more accurate predictions about other
people’s intentions. Recent evidence from psychological research
reveals the relationship between cognitive skills and the theory
of mind. Using the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (RMET,
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) to measure one’s theory of mind,
Ibanez et al. (2013) find that people with higher cognitive skills
are better at infering the internal emotional states of others6.
Relatedly, the results of a neuroeconomic experiment on the p-
beauty contest game by Coricelli and Nagel (2009) suggest that
strategic thinking about other players’ thoughts and behavior
is implemented by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) – one of
the brain areas commonly associated with theory of mind7.
An economic experiment by Carpenter et al. (2013) also shows
that people with higher cognitive ability make more accurate
predictions of others’ choices in a 20-player beauty contest
game. Second, people with higher cognitive skills apply more
sophisticated reasoning and are more apt in strategic adaptation.
Burks et al. (2009) report that subjects with higher cognitive
skills more accurately predict others’ behavior in a sequential
prisoners’ dilemma game, and adapt their own behavior more
strongly. In the context of the p-beauty contest game, subjects
with higher cognitive skills are not only found to carry out more
steps of reasoning on the equilibrium path (Burnham et al., 2009;
Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), but also to adapt their behavior to their
opponents’ cognitive skills (Gill and Prowse, forthcoming) as well
as to their beliefs about their opponents’ cognitive skills (Fehr and
5Cognitive skills are often measured using (amongst others) the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005), the Raven’s progressive matrices test
(Raven, 2008), or both (like in this study). The details of these two measures are
presented in Section 2.
6RMET consists of a series of photos of the area of the face involving the eyes.
Subjects are asked to choose one of the four words that best describes what the
person in the photo is thinking or feeling.
7See Hampton et al. (2008) for related evidence.
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TABLE 2 | Overview of existing experimental evidence.
Experiment Form Payoff Outcomes (%)
(L) (R,r) (R,l) L R,r R,l r|R r
Beard, Beil–Tr.1 Seq (9.75; 3.0) (10; 5.0) (3; 4.75) 66 29 6 83 —
Beard, Beil–Tr.2 Seq (9.00; 3.0) (10; 5.0) (3; 4.75) 65 35 0 100 —
Beard, Beil–Tr.3 Seq (7.00; 3.0) (10; 5.0) (3; 4.75) 20 80 0 100 —
Beard, Beil–Tr.4 Seq (9.75; 3.0) (10; 5.0) (3; 3.00) 47 53 0 100 —
Beard, Beil–Tr.5 Seq (9.75; 6.0) (10; 5.0) (3; 3.00) 86 14 0 100 —
Beard, Beil–Tr.7 Seq (58.50; 18.0) (18.0; 28.50) (60; 30.0) 67 33 0 100 —
Beard et al.–Tr.1 Seq (1450; 450) (1500; 750) (450; 700) 79 18 3 83 —
Beard et al.–Tr.2 Seq (1050; 450) (1500; 750) (450; 700) 50 32 18 64 —
Goeree, Holt–Tr.1 Ext (80; 50) (90; 70) (20; 10) 16 84 0 100 —
Goeree, Holt–Tr.2 Ext (80; 50) (90; 70) (20; 68) 52 36 12 75 —
Goeree, Holt–Tr.3 Ext (400; 250) (450; 350) (100; 348) 80 16 4 80 —
Cooper, Van Huyck–Tr.9 Str (4; 1) (6; 5) (2; 4) 27 — — — 86
Cooper, Van Huyck–Tr.9 Ext (4; 1) (6; 5) (2; 4) 21 — — — 84
JZ, 2014–BT1 Str (9.75; 3.0) (3.0; 4.75) (10; 5.0) 51 41 8 84 81
JZ, 2014–ET1 Str (9.75; 5.0) (5.0; 9.75) (10; 10.0) 54 33 13 72 73
JZ, 2014–ET3 Str (9.75; 5.5) (5.5; 8.50) (10; 10.0) 39 48 13 79 76
JZ, 2014–ET4 Str (8.50; 5.5) (5.5; 8.50) (10; 10.0) 25 61 14 82 82
JZ, 2014–ET2 Str (8.50; 8.5) (6.5; 8.50) (10; 10.0) 26 70 4 94 94
JZ, 2014–BT2 Str (8.50; 7.0) (6.5; 7.00) (10; 8.5) 26 70 4 94 94
For each implementation in row, the first column describes the actual design of the experiment: simultaneous-move strategic-form game (Str), simultaneous-move extensive-form game
(Ext), sequential-move game (Seq). The monetary payoffsof each outcome, displayed in columns 2–4, are in USD in Beard and Beil (1994) and Cooper and Van Huyck (2003), in cents
of USD in Goeree and Holt (2001), in Yens in Beard et al. (2001), and in Euros in Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014). The game is repeated ten times in changing pairs in Jacquemet
and Zylbersztejn (2014), and one-shot in all other instances.
Huck, 2015). Third, cognitive skills may be associated with the
economic efficiency of outcomes of both individual and group
activities. Corgnet et al. (2015b) find that higher cognitive skills
predict better performance and less shirking in an experimental
labor task (summing up tables of 36 numbers without using
a pen). Jones (2008), Al-Ubaydli et al. (in press), and Proto
et al. (2014) report that groups with higher cognitive skills attain
higher cooperation rates in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games.
On the other hand, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2013) do not find a
relationship between groupmembers’ average cognitive skills and
the efficiency of outcomes in a stag hunt coordination8.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we provide new evidence
on the relationship between strategic behavior and cognitive
skills. We show that systematic mismatches between theoretical
predictions and actual behavior in a classic 2 × 2 dominance-
solvable game have cognitive underpinnings. Subjects with
higher cognitive skills are found to be more likely to play
dominant strategy and to best respond to other’s strategy.
Furthermore, cognitive skills predict strategic sophistication:
only those players with sufficiently high cognitive ability are
found to display sensitivity to the presence of uncertainty
about others’ behavior. Our second contribution lies in
8Al-Ubaydli et al. (2013, in press) also report that individual cognitive skills do not
predict individual willingness to reach efficient outcomes in these two game.
experimental methodology. We extend the recent body of
laboratory experiments comparing the performance of different
measures of cognitive skills in predicting economic behavior.
Notwithstanding the previous results (see e.g., Brañas-Garza
et al., 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015a), we report that the Raven’s test
score is a more general predictor of strategic behavior than the
Cognitive Reflection Test score.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiment is based on a 2 × 2 factorial design that varies
the payoff matrix and the nature of player B. Each of the four
resulting experimental treatments is implemented through a
between-subject procedure—each subject participates in only one
experimental condition. This data come from a large dataset, part
of which has been previously used by Hanaki et al. (2016). The
main focus of that study is player As’ behavior under strategic
uncertainty and its relation to monetary incentives and fluid
intelligence. Certain elements of their design (such as the use of
Human and Robot conditions and interest in players’ cognitive
skills) inevitably needed to be adopted in the present study in
order to address a much more general question of the empirical
validity of the solution concept of dominance solvability. More
precisely, we are interested in both players’ behavior (so as to
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measure the use of dominance by player Bs and the use of iterated
dominance by player As under different information structures).
We also make a methodological contribution, since in this paper
we associate players’ behavior with multiple facets of cognitive
skills: fluid intelligence (measured by Raven’s test) and cognitive
reflection (measured by CRT).
Our first treatment variable is the size of the stakes, as
represented by Game 1 and Game 2 in Table 3. Although they
have the same strategic properties, these two game matrices
differ in terms of the saliency of monetary incentives to use
(iterated) dominance. In Game 2, player As may earn a surplus
of only 0.25 when moving from L to (R, r) (with payoff going
from 9.75 to 10), while ending up in (R, l) is relatively costly
(yielding only 3). In Game 1, the potential gains and losses
from action R relative to L are more balanced: the gain from
moving from L to (R, r) increases to 1.5 (with payoff moving
from 8.5 to 10), while the outcome (R, l) becomes less costly
(now yielding 6.5). The incentives of player Bs, in turn, go in
the opposite direction: the gain from using the dominant strategy
r (and conditional on player As’ choice R) is lower in Game 1
[with payoff increasing from 4.75 to 5 between (R, l) and (R, r)]
than in Game 2 (where payoff increases from 8.5 to 10). In line
with Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014) and Hanaki et al. (2016)
(who report that both players only react to their own monetary
incentives) and as discussed in Section 3.1, each of these games
generates sizable yet diverse empirical violations of dominance
solvability. These two games together thus provide a wide range
of monetary incentives to use dominance solvability within a
common strategic environment9.
Our second treatment variable is related to the nature of
player B (the column player) who may be represented either
by a human subject (Human condition) or a pre-programmed
computer (Robot condition). The Human condition enables us
to capture two cardinal breaches of dominance solvability: the
failure to use the dominant strategy (player Bs’ behavior) and
the failure to best respond to others’ dominant actions (player
TABLE 3 | The experimental games.
GAME 1
B
l r
A L (8.50 ; 3.00) ( 8.50 ; 3.00)
R (6.50 ; 4.75) (10.00 ; 5.00)
GAME 2
B
l r
A L (9.75 ; 8.50) ( 9.75 ; 8.50)
R (3.00 ; 8.50) (10.00 ; 10.00)
9Herein, we restrict our design to these two game matrices and do not seek to
further investigate the effects of monetary incentives on both players’ behavior.
These effects are analyzed in detail in Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014) and
Hanaki et al. (2016).
As’ behavior). However, the latter behavior occurs under strategic
uncertainty and thus might stem from two distinct sources:
bounded rationality and rational behavior under uncertainty.
More precisely, player As may simply have a limited capability of
best responding to dominant strategy, but may also intentionally
refrain from best responding when in doubt about player Bs’
use of dominant strategy. To separate these two effects, we
introduce the Robot condition in which a human subject acting
as player A interacts with a computerized player B who is pre-
programmed to always choose r. We clearly inform the subjects
in the Robot condition that they are interacting with a pre-
programmed computer: “the computer chooses r at each round,
without exception” (bold in the original instruction sheet). This
is the only difference in the rules and procedures betweenHuman
and Robot conditions10. Thus, the key property of the Robot
condition as compared to the Human condition is neutralizing
strategic uncertainty player As face, while maintaining space for
boundedly rational behavior.
The design of the experiment is otherwise the same in all
four experimental conditions. We explore whether behavior
is sensitive to learning by considering ten uniform, one-shot
interactions. In order to homogenize incentives across rounds,
the following rules are implemented: all games are played in strict
anonymity, roles are fixed, and subjects’ payoffs are computed
based one randomly drawn round. In the Human condition,
players are matched into pairs using a perfect stranger, round-
robin scheme, which guarantees that subjects are involved in
a series of one-shot interactions despite the repetition of the
game11.
Our control variables also include two measures of cognitive
skills. Both of them are introduced as part of a post-experimental
supplementary task. Subjects’ participation is rewardedwith extra
five Euros; otherwise, their answers are not incentivized12. The
supplementary task starts with a debriefing question, where
subjects are asked to “report any information they find relevant
about how their decisions has been made.” Then, we implement
the following measures of cognitive skills.
The first task is the standard Cognitive Reflection Test based
on Frederick (2005) which “measures cognitive reflectiveness
or impulsiveness, respondents’ automatic response versus more
elaborate and deliberative thought” (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012, p.
255). It contains three questions:
1. A notebook and a pencil cost 1.10 Euros in total. The notebook
costs 1 Euro more than the pencil. How much does the pencil
cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
10An English translation of the original instructions in French is provided as
supplementary material.
11See Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2013) for a detailed motivation and description
of this design.
12Absence of monetary incentives for providing corrects answers is a standard
procedure for both CRT and Raven’s tests. Recent evidence on both tests suggests
that monetary incentives do not per se affect people’s performance. See Brañas
Garza et al. (2015) for a metastudy on the determinants of CRT scores and Eckartz
et al. (2012) and Dessi and Rustichini (2015) for experimental evidence on the role
of monetary incentives in Raven’s test.
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3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake?
Subjects are informed that this set of three questions should
be answered within 30 s (although we allow them to provide
answers even after this time has elapsed). In this way, subjects
can be classified according to their overall score (that is, the total
number of correct answers) which can range from 0 to 3.
The second task is Raven’s progressive matrix test (often
called Raven’s test), a picture based, non-verbal measure of
fluid intelligence, that is “the capacity to think logically, analyze
and solve novel problems, independent of background knowledge”
(Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013, p. 48). It is widely used by,
e.g., psychologists, educators, and the military (Raven, 2000). It
consists of a series of tasks to be solved within a fixed amount
of time. In each task, a subject should pick a single element
(among eight options) that best fits a set of eight pictures. The
level of difficulty increases from one question to the other13. In
our experiment, each participant is given a series of 16 tasks to
be solved within 10 min. Individual scores in Raven’ test are
computed as the number of correct answers to the 16 items of
the test.
2.1. Experimental Procedures
For each game matrix, we run three Human sessions (involving
20 subjects per session: 10 player As interacting with 10 player
Bs), and two Robot sessions (involving 20 player As per session
interacting with automated player Bs). Subjects are given a
fixed fee equal to five euros to compensate participation to the
experiment.
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants are randomly
assigned to their computers and asked to fill in a short
administrative questionnaire containing basic questions about
their age, gender, education, etc. Experimental instructions are
then read aloud: subjects are informed that they will playmultiple
rounds of the same game, each round with a different partner,
and that their own role will remain unchanged throughout
the experiment. Finally, subjects are asked to answer a short
comprehension quiz. Once the quiz and any questions from
participants are answered, the experiment begins. After each
of the ten rounds of the game, subjects are only informed of
their own payoffs. Information about past choices and payoffs
is updated after each round and displayed at the bottom of
the screen. Take-home earnings correspond to the outcome of
a single round that is randomly drawn at the end of each
experimental session.
In addition, the experimental game is followed by
supplementary tasks. An additional five euros fee is paid to
each subject for completing this part. Immediately after the end
of the experimental game, participants are provided with a brief
round-by-round summary of their decisions and outcomes, and
are asked to provide in a blank space on their computer screens
any relevant comments in particular about what might have
affected their decisions during the experiment. Subjects are also
13See Raven (2008) for an overview.
asked to solve the CRT test and a reduced-form Raven’s test
described above.
All the sessions were conducted in February and March 2014.
Out of the 200 participants (94 males), 155 were students with
various fields of specialization. The majority of subjects (65%)
had already taken part in economic experiments. Participants’
average age was 25.6 (st. dev. is 7.5). All sessions took place
at the Laboratoire d’Economie Experimentale de Paris (LEEP) at
Paris School of Economics. Subjects were recruited via an on-
line registration system based on ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the
experiment was computerized through software developed under
REGATE (Zeiliger, 2000) and z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions
lasted about 45–60 min, with an average payoff of roughly 18.83
euros (including a five euros show-up fee and five euros for
completing the post-experimental tasks).
3. RESULTS
Our main experimental results can be summarized as follows.
First, in line with the existing literature, we observe systematic
and sizable deviations from standard predictions based on the
principle of dominance solvability. This phenomenon persists
across gamematrices and despite repetition. Second, we associate
strategic behavior with cognitive skills. We find that Raven’s test
score is a more reliable predictor of strategic behavior than CRT
score: whenever the latter predicts behavior, the former does too,
but not vice versa. Subjects with higher Raven’s test scores are
more likely to use the dominant strategy and to best respond to
other player’s dominant strategy. Unlike those with low Raven’s
test score, they also react to the presence of strategic uncertainty.
3.1. Aggregate Behavior in Experimental
Games
Table 4 outlines the main patterns of behavior in our
experimental games. The statistical significance of the changes
observed in this table is tested by Models 1–3 in Table 5. We
first focus on the aggregate frequency of Pareto-Nash equilibrium
(R, r) – the sole outcome that survives the iterated elimination of
(weakly) dominated strategies—found in the Human condition.
In both games, we observe substantial deviations from the
predictions of this solution concept: overall, players attain the
(R, r) outcome 58% of times in Game 1 and 43% in Game 2
(Model 1, H0 : β1 = 0, p = 0.318). We also observe that
efficiency increases over time: in both games, we observe the
lowest frequency of (R, r) in the initial round (0.333 in Game 1
and 0.200 in Game 2), whereas the highest frequency of (R, r)
occurs in the final round (0.700 in Game 1 and 0.533 in Game 2).
To further explore the roots of these deviations, we turn to
the aggregate patterns of both players’ behavior in Human and
Robot conditions. We focus on three behavioral dimensions of
dominance solvability: the use of dominant strategy (captured by
player Bs’ behavior in the Human condition) and the ability to
best respond to other player’s dominant action with and without
bearing the uncertainty about the latter (which is captured
by player As’ behavior in the Human and Robot conditions,
respectively).
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TABLE 4 | Aggregate results.
Round Overall
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pr (R,r) in the Human condition
Game 1 0.333 0.600 0.667 0.700 0.567 0.600 0.433 0.633 0.567 0.700 0.580
Game 2 0.200 0.333 0.400 0.400 0.433 0.500 0.500 0.433 0.467 0.533 0.420
Pr (r) by player B in the Human condition
Game 1 0.767 0.800 0.867 0.900 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.833 0.867 0.800 0.813
Game 2 0.833 0.933 0.900 0.933 1.000 0.933 0.933 0.900 0.900 0.933 0.920
Pr (R) by player A in the Human condition
Game 1 0.500 0.733 0.700 0.767 0.767 0.800 0.700 0.767 0.700 0.867 0.730
Game 2 0.300 0.333 0.400 0.400 0.433 0.533 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.533 0.447
Pr (R) by player A in the Robot condition
Game 1 0.700 0.750 0.750 0.725 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.825 0.800 0.775 0.773
Game 2 0.500 0.575 0.725 0.575 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.690
Columns 1–10 summarize the frequencies of outcomes (defined in rows) as % of all outcomes observed in each round of a given experimental treatment. The last column provides
overall results.
TABLE 5 | Aggregate results: statistical support.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pr (R, r) Pr (r) Pr (R)
Constant (β0) 0.580*** 0.813*** 0.730***
(0.144) (0.032) (0.084)
1[Game 2] (β1) –0.160 0.107* –0.283**
(0.103) (0.044) (0.140)
1[Robot] (β2) 0.043
(0.103)
1[Robot]× 1[Game 2] (β3) 0.201
(0.161)
N 600 600 1400
R2 0.026 0.025 0.066
Estimates of linear probability models on outcome (R, r) (Model 1), decision r by player
B (Model 2) and decision R by player A (Model 3). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the session level in Human treatments (three clusters per game matrix, six in
total) and individual level in the Robot condition (40 clusters per game matrix, 80 in total)
and computed using the delete-one jackknife procedure. All models contain a dummy
variable set to 1 for game matrix 2 (and 0 for game matrix 1). In Model 3, we also introduce
an additional dummy variable set to 1 for Robot condition (and 0 for Human condition)
and well as the interaction between these two variables. */**/*** indicate significance at
the 10/5/1% level.
Inefficiency is caused by both players, although their roles
differ from one game to another: the scope of inefficient behavior
is similar for both players in Game 1, and highly asymmetric in
Game 2. Overall, player As select action R with probability 0.730
in Game 1 and 0.447 in Game 2 (Model 3, H0 : β1 = 0, p =
0.047). However, player As’ behavior happens to be misaligned
with player Bs’ actual decisions which follow the opposite trend:
the total frequency of action r increases from 0.813 in Game 1 to
0.920 in Game 2 (Model 2, H0 : β1 = 0, p = 0.060). Importantly,
the data from Robot sessions suggest that the uncertainty about
player Bs’ behavior is not the only driver of player As’ choices.
Player As frequently and systematically fail to best respond to
player Bs’ dominant action even when the latter comes with
certainty in the Robot condition, although their willingness to
select action R increases in both games as compared to the
Human condition (to 0.773 in Game 1 and 0.690 in Game 2)14.
The fact that inefficient actions from player As prevail in the
absence of strategic uncertainty may suggest that at least some
of them are boundedly rational decision makers.
In the next section, we analyze how these three behavioral
components of dominance solvability vary as a function of
players’ cognitive skills.
3.2. Cognitive Skills and Strategic Behavior
The average score in Raven’s test (CRT) is 8.679 out of 16 with SD
3.117 (0.479 out of 3 with SD 0.852). Our experimental sample is
properly randomized across treatments regarding bothmeasures.
We do not reject the null hypothesis that Raven’s test scores have
the same distributions in all treatments (p = 0.275, Kruskal-
Wallis test). A Kruskal-Wallis test applied to the CRT scores leads
to the same conclusion (p = 0.502).
We also replicate several results from previous studies
combining Raven’s test and CRT regarding the relationship
between both scores as well as gender differences (Brañas-Garza
14Model 3 suggests that these two proportions are not significantly different:
testing H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 yields p = 0.303. The increase in the proportion of
decisions R between Human and Robot conditions is insignificant for Game 1
(H0 :β2 = 0, p = 0.679) and significant for Game 2 (H0 :β2+β3 = 0, p = 0.054).
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et al., 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015a). There is a moderate, yet
highly significant correlation between Raven and CRT scores
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.306, p < 0.001) which suggests that they may
have a common source, but do not capture the same cognitive
skills. Furthermore, the average score of males is significantly
higher than the average score of females (Raven’s test: 9.382 with
SD 0.341 vs. 8.014 with SD 0.384, p = 0.009; CRT: 0.676 with SD
0.111 vs. 0.291 with SD 0.087, p = 0.007; two-sided t-tests)15.
We also observe that many subjects (70%) of our 200
participants fail to provide at least one correct answer in our
standard CRT. 16% provide exactly one , 8% – two, and 6% –
three correct answers. This stands in line with Brañas-Garza et al.
(2012) who report the respective frequencies of 67, 23, 9, and
1% for a similar sample size (N = 191), and echoes the scores
in the least performant sample reported in a seminal study by
Frederick (2005): out of 138 students of the University of Toledo,
64% provide no correct answer, 21% provide one, 10% provide
two, and 5% provide three corrects answers.
3.2.1. Cognitive Predictors of Strategic Behavior:
Aggregate Results
In this part, we study the cognitive correlates of strategic
behavior. Figures 1, 2 present the aggregate evolution of behavior
as a function of cognitive skills, measured either by CRT score
or by Raven’s test score across roles (player A or player B) and
experimental conditions (Human or Robot).
In Figure 1, the sample is divided into two subsamples:
subjects who provided at least one correct answer to CRT
(referred to as CRT > 0) and those who did not (referred to
as CRT = 0). The aggregate patterns of behavior weakly differ
between the two subsamples. Bootstrap proportion tests fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the overall proportions of decision
R are the same for both CRT categories in the Human condition
(p = 0.126) and in the Robot condition (p = 0.235)16. The
aggregate proportions of decision r, in turn, are found to be
statistically different (p = 0.037), subjects with a CRT score zero
being less likely to play r than subjects who gave at least one
correct answer.
In Figure 2, we split our sample into three subsamples based
on Raven’s test score (1st tertile: less than 8 correct answers,
2nd tertile: between 8 and 10 correct answers, 3rd tertile: more
than 10 correct answers). Although, bootstrap proportion tests
suggest that player As’ behavior in the Human condition does
not vary significantly between these three subsamples (1st tertile
vs. 2nd tertile: p = 0.255, 2nd vs. 3rd: p = 0.580, 1st vs. 3rd:
p = 0.565), significant differences arise for both player As in the
Robot condition (p = 0.001, p = 0.735, p < 0.001, respectively)
and for player Bs (p = 0.064, p = 0.057, p < 0.001, respectively).
Raven’s test score seems to have a more systematic association
15See also Frederick (2005) and Bosch-Domènech et al. (2014) for related evidence.
16We test the difference in proportion of a given outcome between two
experimental conditions by carrying out a bootstrap proportion test that
accounts for within-subject correlation, i.e., the fact that the same individual
takes 10 decisions. The procedure consists of bootstrapping subjects and their
corresponding decisions over all 10 rounds instead of bootstrapping decisions as
independent observations (see e.g., Jacquemet et al., 2013, for a detailed description
of the procedure).
with players’ behavior than CRT score, although both measures
fail to predict behavior under strategic uncertainty.
3.2.2. Cognitive Skills and Dominance Solvability:
Regression Analysis
In what follows, we provide further econometric insights into
these preliminary results. Following Brañas-Garza et al. (2012);
Corgnet et al. (2015a), we use three individual characteristics
discussed in the previous section – gender, Raven’s test score
and CRT score (kept as a dummy variable with value 1 if
the subject gave at least one correct answer at the CRT test
and 0 otherwise) – to explain behavior in our experimental
games17. The econometric specification is based on the linear
probability model and the estimation procedure is outlined in
Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2014). We also control for payoff
scheme and repetition effects by including game matrix and
round dummies. We consider three different outcome variables:
player As’ behavior in the Human and the Robot treatment,
and player Bs’ behavior in the Human treatment. Given the
correlation between CRT and Raven’s test scores, including both
variables in the model might result in multicollinearity and lead
to the under-rejection of the nullity of respective coefficients.
For each outcome, we first include these two measures separately
in Models 1 and 2, while Model 3 includes both variables. This
evidence is summarized in Table 6.
We first turn to player Bs’ behavior. Models 1 and 2 suggest
that both the coefficient of CRT > 0 dummy and the coefficient
of Raven’s test score are positive and significant (p = 0.067 for
CRT > 0 and p = 0.015 for Raven). In Model 3, the coefficient
of Raven’s test score remains highly significant (p = 0.014), while
the coefficient of CRT becomes insignificant (p = 0.253). Their
joint significance (p = 0.034) implies that cognitive skills predict
the use of dominant strategy.
We now turn to player As’ behavior in the Human condition.
Notwithstanding the previous set of results, cognitive skills are
not found to explain player As’ choices. The coefficient of
CRT > 0 dummy is insignificant (p = 0.226) in Model 1,
and so is the coefficient of Raven’s test score (p = 0.633)
in Model 2. If we account for both, Model 3 reveals that the
coefficients of both scores are neither individually (p = 0.226
for CRT > 0 and p = 0.550 for Raven’s test score) nor jointly
significant (p = 0.503). Finally, the behavior of player As in the
Robot condition is only predicted by Raven’s test score: unlike
CRT > 0 dummy, its coefficient remains positive and highly
significant across models (p ≤ 0.001). Unsurprisingly, the joint
insignificance of both coefficients in Model 3 is also rejected
(p = 0.003).
Altogether, the results presented in Table 6 suggest that
cognitive skills predict certain components of strategic behavior:
the use of dominant strategy (reflected in player Bs’ behavior),
as well as the ability to best respond to other player’s dominant
strategy (reflected in player As’ behavior in the Robot condition).
Moreover, in both cases Raven’s test score is a more reliable
predictor of behavior than CRT score. However, we also observe
17Given that most CRT scores in our sample are null and the higher the score, the
less frequent it gets, dichotomizing the CRT score variable limits the impact of the
outliers on the overall results.
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FIGURE 1 | CRT score and aggregate behavior across rounds and treatments.
FIGURE 2 | Raven’s test score and aggregate behavior across rounds and treatments.
that Raven’s test score fails to predict player As’ behavior
once player Bs’ behavior becomes uncertain, that is once we
move from Robot to Human condition. This, in turn, points
toward an interplay between the degree of strategic uncertainty,
behavior in the experimental games, and individual cognitive
skills. Importantly, the existence of such an interplay is also
supported by Figure 2 which shows that the aggregate levels of
efficiency shift upwards between the Human condition and the
Robot condition for the 2nd and 3rd Raven’s score tertile, but not
the 1st tertile.
In order to formally test this conjecture, we now look
at the reaction of player As with different cognitive skills
to the disappearance of strategic uncertainty. Splitting the
data according to Raven’s score tertile, for each of the three
subsamples we compare player As’ behavior in the Human
condition to their behavior in the Robot condition by regressing
player As’ choice on the Robot dummy (set to 1 for the Robot
and to 0 for the Human condition). We also include the previous
set of independent variables (except for Raven’s test score
itself).
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TABLE 6 | Cognitive predictors of strategic behavior: regression analysis.
Pr (R) by player A Pr (r) by player B
Human condition Robot condition Human condition
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Const. 0.423*** 0.552** 0.563** 0.573*** 0.242* 0.240* 0.705*** 0.430*** 0.444***
(0.080) (0.176) (0.197) (0.088) (0.135) (0.135) (0.027) (0.103) (0.099)
1[CRT>0] 0.131 0.152 0.062 (0.024) 0.109* 0.046
(0.095) (0.121) (0.102) (0.102) (0.047) (0.036)
Raven 0.013 0.018 0.0426*** 0.0434*** 0.0313** 0.0287**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
1[Game 2] -0.270* 0.263 0.266 0.068 0.054 0.056 0.100 0.132* 0.129*
(0.129) (0.139) (0.136) (0.083) (0.076) (0.079) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
1[Male] 0.132 0.187 0.158 0.096 0.072 0.077 0.025 0.024 0.017
(0.126) (0.100) (0.107) (0.090) (0.076) (0.089) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
Round:
2 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.067 0.067 0.067
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
3 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.083 0.083 0.083
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
4 0.183** 0.183** 0.183** 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.117* 0.117* 0.117*
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
5 0.200* 0.200* 0.200* 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.100 0.100 0.100
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
6 0.267** 0.267** 0.267** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.067 0.067 0.067
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
7 0.217* 0.217* 0.217* 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
8 0.233** 0.233** 0.233** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.067 0.067 0.067
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
9 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.083 0.083 0.083
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
10 0.300** 0.300** 0.300** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.067 0.067 0.067
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
R2 0.151 0.141 0.160 0.050 0.139 0.140 0.060 0.108 0.111
Estimates of linear probability models explaining the likelihood of decision R by player A and decision r by player B. Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered at the session level in
the Human condition (three clusters per game matrix, six in total) and individual level in the Robot condition (40 clusters per game matrix, 80 in total) and computed using the delete-one
jackknife procedure. Models 1 and 2 include a single measure of cognitive skills (a dummy set to 1 for a positive CRT score, or Raven’s test score), while Model 3 combines both
variables. Other independent variables include gender, game matrix and round dummies. The number of observations is N = 600 for Human and N = 800 for Robot conditions. */**/***
indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level.
These results are summarized in Table 7. The coefficient of
the Robot dummy captures the effect of eliminating strategic
uncertainty on player As’ behavior for each of the three
subsamples. This suggests that only player As with high enough
cognitive skills are sensitive to the uncertainty about player Bs’
behavior. The behavior of players with low Raven’s test score (1st
tertile) is unresponsive to the degree of strategic uncertainty: the
coefficient of the Robot dummy is close to zero and insignificant
(p = 0.822). For players withmedium scores (2nd tertile), we find
a positive yet weakly significant effect (p = 0.087) which becomes
amplified and highly significant for those player As whose Raven’s
test score belongs to the 3rd tertile of the experimental sample
(p = 0.012).
Finally, it is also worth noting that player As’ reaction to the
payoff scheme also varies as a function of Raven’s test score. The
coefficient of the Game 2 dummy is close to zero and highly
insignificant in the 1st tertile regression (p = 0.890). Then, it
becomes negative in 2nd and 3rd tertile models (although it is
only statistically significant in the former with p = 0.012 and
p = 0.271, respectively). This, in turn, stands in line with the
previous finding that player As’ willingness to play R increases
as the safe choice L becomes less attractive relative to outcome
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TABLE 7 | The effect of strategic uncertainty and cognitive skills: evidence
from player As’ behavior in Human and Robot conditions.
Raven’s test score tertile
1st 2nd 3rd
Constant 0.277* 0.592*** 0.330**
(0.147) (0.065) (0.135)
1[Robot] 0.044 0.158* 0.428**
(0.195) (0.090) (0.155)
1[CRT>0] 0.002 0.038 0.016
(0.262) (0.066) (0.188)
1[Male] 0.144 0.033 0.212
(0.145) (0.063) (0.179)
1[Game 2] 0.034 −0.245** −0.176
(0.146) (0.092) (0.155)
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 480 610 310
R2 0.048 0.173 0.298
Estimates of linear probability models on decision R by player A. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the session level in the Human condition (three clusters
per game matrix, six in total) and individual level in the Robot condition (40 clusters per
game matrix, 80 in total) and computed using the delete-one jackknife procedure. Data
from Human and Robot conditions are pooled and split into three subsamples based on
Raven’s test score tertiles. Other independent variables include a dummy set to 1 for a
positive CRT score, as well as gender, game matrix and round dummies (omitted from the
table). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level.
(R, r). It also seems that the magnitude of this effect is mediated
by player As’ cognitive skills, although not in a monotone way.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the relationship between strategic behavior
and cognitive skills—cognitive reflection and fluid intelligence—
in a classic 2 × 2 dominance-solvable game. Our results show
that subjects with higher fluid intelligence (measured by Raven’s
progressive matrices test) are more likely to play dominant
strategy, and also more likely to best respond to other’s strategy.
Furthermore, fluid intelligence predicts strategic sophistication:
only those players with sufficiently high Raven’s test score are
found to display sensitivity to the presence of uncertainty about
others’ behavior. Cognitive reflection (measured by CRT), in
turn, lacks the power to predict behavior in our experimental
setting. We see three main conclusions that stem from these
findings.
First, these results contribute to the ongoing debate on the
relationship between rationality and intelligence (see Stanovich,
2009, for a critical review). For instance, Stanovich and West
(2014) distinguish between two aspects of rational behavior:
instrumental rationality which is understood as the “ability
to take appropriate action given one’s goals and beliefs,” and
epistemic rationality which enables agents to hold “beliefs that
are commensurate with available evidence.” In the strategic
environment investigated in this paper, instrumental rationality
can be associated with the ability to solve the game, while
epistemic rationality—with the ability to play it with others. Our
experimental data suggest an important relationship between
fluid intelligence (rather than reflective thinking) and both of
these facets of rationality in strategic settings. Both the ability
to use dominance and iterated dominance to efficiently solve the
game, as well as the responsiveness to the availability of strategic
information, is found to be predicted by Raven’s test score (but
not by CRT score).
The second contribution is related to the experimental
methodology. Despite the fact that CRT and Raven’s test are
both commonly used to measure cognitive skills in experimental
subject pools, still very little is known about their relative
performance in predicting different types of behavior. Therefore,
the choice of one test over the other may happen to be at least as
intuitive as evidence-based. As mentioned before, to the best of
our knowledge only two experiments address this issue. Brañas-
Garza et al. (2012) do so in a strategic environment (p-beauty
contest game), while Corgnet et al. (2015a)—in a non-strategic
one (individual choices on wealth distribution). Both studies find
that CRT performs better than Raven’s test in predicting subjects’
behavior. The result of the present experiment points the to the
opposite conclusion. We believe that this difference is driven
by the very nature of the experimental tasks which may involve
different types of cognitive effort. In our view, this issue deserves
attention in future research.
Finally, although we find evidence that behaving in
accordance with dominance solvability is positively correlated
with cognitive skills, we also substantiate that most of the
variance in individual decision making cannot be explained by
such skills. Thus, exploring factors alongside cognitive skills
that generate strategic behavior remains an open and important
empirical question. An interesting avenue is to disentangle
individual determinants, e.g., personal characteristics (such as
cognitive skills) that are associated with appropriate behavior,
from environmental determinants, that is, those features of the
decision making environment that lead decision makers to take
certain types of actions.
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